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ABSTRACT 
The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) was created in 2006 with wide-
ranging powers to protect human rights, promote equal opportunities and encourage 
mutual respect between different groups. Alongside the Commission, individuals, through 
the courts and sector-specific enforcers (such as ombudsmen and regulators), have also 
been given equality and human rights enforcement powers. Within this enforcement 
landscape, the Commission has struggled to craft an enforcement role for itself. For the 
first time, this article, through the mapping of these different actors in their shared 
regulatory space, outlines a role for the EHRC in equality and human rights enforcement.  
This role consists of three primary tasks: (1) taking action that courts and sector-specific 
enforcers are unable to perform; (2) overcoming some of the limitations of private 
enforcement in the courts; and (3) coordinating and supporting sector-specific enforcers. 
The article concludes by exploring how the EHRC can effectively fulfil this role.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) was created in 2006 to merge the 
Equal Opportunities Commission, the Commission for Racial Equality and the Disability 
Rights Commission (the legacy Commissions).  The establishment of a single 
commission was intended to utilise the expertise of the legacy commissions to take a 
cross-cutting approach that would address all equality and human rights concerns within 
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society.  It was envisaged that the Commission would act as a single point of contact for 
individuals and organisations, to tackle multiple discrimination, to pursue a coherent 
approach to combating discrimination and to identify and promote creative responses to 
problems.1  The Commission was therefore made responsible for tackling discrimination 
across all protected characteristics of discrimination and for protecting and promoting 
human rights across England, Wales and Scotland.2  To achieve this remit the 
Commission was given a wide range of enforcement powers including monitoring the 
effectiveness of equality and human rights law;3 monitoring progress in society;4 
publishing information, providing advice and issuing codes of practice;5 conducting 
inquiries;6 issuing grants;7 undertaking investigations;8 providing legal assistance for 
equality claims;9 instituting or intervening in legal proceedings;10 and assessing 
compliance with the public sector duties.11  The first Chair, Trevor Phillips, outlined an 
ambitious role for the EHRC that went beyond the work of the legacy Commissions (which 
he argued had focused on giving groups a voice and retrospective remedies).  This role 
aimed for institutional change by addressing the causes that lie behind discrimination and 
promoting systemic change.12   
                                                          
1 Department for Trade and Industry, Fairness For All: A New Commission for Equality and Human Rights 
(Cm 6185, 2004) paras 1.14-1.17. 
2 In relation to Scotland the Commission’s remit extends only to enforcing equality law: Equality Act 2006, 
ss 1, 8-9.  
3 Ibid, s 11.  
4 Ibid, s 12. 
5 Ibid, ss 13–15. 
6 Ibid, s 16. 
7 Ibid, s 17. 
8 Ibid, ss 20-24. 
9 Ibid, ss 28-29. 
10 Ibid, ss 30. 
11 Ibid, ss 31-32. 
12 Trevor Phillips Speech (Department for Children, Schools and Families and Department for Innovation, 
Universities and Skills Joint Research Conference 2007, 16 November 2007) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080821115857/dcsf.gov.uk/research/data/general/trevor%2
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However, the Commission was to be hampered in realising these ambitions as it 
encountered a number of significant problems in its early years of operation.  First, groups 
who had seen the legacy Commissions as campaign groups for their interests felt 
alienated from the EHRC as they believed they were no longer being represented.13  
Second, the Commission struggled to go beyond the work of the legacy Commissions 
(who had focused on equality) and incorporate human rights into its work, which resulted 
in public criticism from the Joint Committee on Human Rights.14  Third, there were 
problems with the Commission’s internal structure and the ability of the personnel (many 
of whom had transferred from the existing commissions) to be able to work and speak 
with a single voice, which resulted in six commissioners resigning.15  Fourth, the EHRC 
was criticised for its management of financial resources when it had its first two sets of 
accounts qualified.16  Finally, and an issue that underlaid many of the other problems the 
Commission experienced, was the role of the EHRC in equality and human rights 
enforcement.17  It was unclear whether it was the role of the Commission to ensure 
                                                          
0phillips%20keynote%20speech.doc> accessed 3 April 2018; EHRC, ‘Business Plan 2008/9’ (EHRC 
2008) 4. 
13 J Squires Is the EHRC working? (2009), available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/jul/21/equality-human-rights-commission; 
1990 Trusts, ‘Our Rights, Our Future’ (1990 Trust 2005); T Choudhury, ‘The Commission for Equality and 
Human Rights: Designing the Big Tent’ (2006) 13 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 
312-22; C O’Cinneide, ‘The Commission for Equality and Human Rights: A New Institution for New and 
Uncertain Times’ (2007) 36(2) Industrial Law Journal 141. 
14 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Equality and Human Rights Commission (2009-10, HL 72, HC 183). 
15 D Mabbett, ‘Aspirational Legalism and the Role of the Equality and Human Rights Commission in 
Equality Policy’ (2008) 79(1) The Political Quarterly 45; Joint Committee on Human Rights, Equality and 
Human Rights Commission (2009-10, HL 72, HC 183). 
16 Comptroller and Auditor General, Equality and Human Rights Commission Annual Report and 
Accounts 2006-08 (HC 2008-09, 632); Committee of Public Accounts, Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (HC 2009-10, 124).  
17 K Hampton The wrong leadership (2009), available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/jul/21/equality-human-rights-commission. 
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compliance with the law (ie focus on ‘getting the bad guys’) or to promote systemic change 
by encouraging organisations to go beyond formal legal requirements and achieve a 
higher standard of implementation (ie focus on ‘guiding the good guys’).18  
 
The problems that the Commission encountered in its first few years of operation 
combined with wider government agendas, particularly the austerity and anti-non 
departmental public body agendas, acted as justifications for government involvement in 
the reform of the EHRC.19  The Coalition government subsequently launched a 
consultation about the role and functions of the Commission.20  The government 
concluded, as a result of this consultation, that the EHRC should be recast as a strategic 
regulator, only acting where it adds value, which has subsequently been reiterated by the 
Commission itself.21  In light of this new strategic role, the Commission’s advice helpline, 
strategic grants programme and conciliation remit were removed and its budget 
drastically cut (from £70.3 million in 2007 to £19.47 million in 2018).22   
 
The EHRC has since addressed many of the problems that plagued it at its creation: 
incorporating the views of different groups while at the same time making clear that it is 
                                                          
18 N Crowther, ‘Bridging the divide – matters to be taken into account regarding the integration of the 
functions of national equality bodies and national human rights institutions’ (October 2013); T Pegram, 
The Equality and Human Rights Commission: Challenges and Opportunities (AHRC 2011) 20. 
19 K Tonkiss, ‘Contesting human rights through institutional reform: the case of the UK Equality and 
Human Rights Commission’ (2016) 20(4) The International Journal of Human Rights 491. 
20  HM Government, ‘Building a fairer Britain: Reform of the Equality and Human Rights Commission’ (HM 
Government 2011). 
21  HM Government, Building a fairer Britain: Reform of the Equality and Human Rights Commission – 
Response to the Consultation (HM Government 2012) 15; EHRC, Strategic plan 2012-15 (EHRC 2012) 
13.  
22 N Crowther, ‘Bridging the divide – matters to be taken into account regarding the integration of the 
functions of national equality bodies and national human rights institutions’ (October 2013) 16; EHRC, 
‘Business Plan: 2018/19 (EHRC 2018) 38; EHRC, ‘Business Plan 2008/9’ (EHRC 2008) 32. 
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not the Commission’s place to lobby for partisan interests; more heavily focusing on 
human rights; establishing a settled governance structure; and having its subsequent 
accounts approved without qualification.  However, one issue that is still unresolved is the 
strategic role the EHRC should play in equality and human rights enforcement (ie should 
it focus on ensuring compliance with the law and/or promote higher standards of 
implementation?).  The second iteration of the EHRC (under the chairship of Onora 
O’Neill) focused more on promotion and implementation (‘shift…to a more enabling role: 
using our expertise and influence to support the development of policies and services that 
promote equality of opportunity and safeguard our fundamental human rights…legal 
action is our last resort, when nudge, persuasion and advice have not proved effective’).23  
In contrast, the third and current iteration of the Commission (under the chairship of David 
Isaac) has placed a heavier emphasis on ensuring compliance (‘keen for the Commission 
to focus more on the use of its legal powers…we should become a more muscular 
regulator’).24  This issue takes on added importance in the context of the significant 
budget cuts the Commission has undertaken and heavy public scrutiny it has endured.  
Unfortunately, there is currently no clear conception of what a strategic role for the EHRC 
looks like.  This is because the majority of research on equality and human rights 
                                                          
23 EHRC, Strategic plan 2012-15 (Stationary Office 2012) 8, 11.  
24 D Isaac Prioritising our legal work (2017), available at https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/our-
work/blogs/prioritising-our-legal-work; D Isaac 10 years on: the fight is far from over (2017), available at 
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/our-work/blogs/prioritising-our-legal-work. 
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enforcement focuses upon individual enforcement through the courts.25  In contrast, 
research on other enforcement mechanisms (particularly the EHRC) is sparse.26 
 
This article begins to tackle this research gap by outlining a role for the Commission in 
equality and human rights enforcement.  It does this by utilising the concept of regulatory 
space to explore the roles of the major equality and human rights enforcement actors, 
courts through individual claims and sector-specific enforcers (the latter is used in the 
article to refer collectively to regulators, inspectorates, and ombudsmen), through which 
it is possible to observe enforcement spaces that the EHRC can fill (ie act strategically to 
add value).  By taking this approach, it is argued that the enforcement role of the EHRC 
consists of three primary tasks: (1) carrying out enforcement action that the other actors 
are unable to perform; (2) overcoming some of the limitations of individual enforcement 
via the courts; and (3) coordinating and supporting sector-specific enforcers.  At the same 
time as elucidating an enforcement role for the EHRC, the article also intends to shed 
light on the utility of looking beyond the courts when exploring the enforcement of equality 
and human rights law. 
 
                                                          
25 For example literature on the workings of sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and s 149 
Equality Act 2010: A Kavanagh, Constitutional Review Under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP 2009); A 
Young, ‘Is dialogue working under the Human Rights Act 1998?’ [2011] Public Law 773; C Chandrachud, 
‘Reconfiguring the discourse on political responses to declarations of incompatibility’ [2014] Public Law 
624; S Fredman, ‘The Public Sector Equality Duty’ (2011) 40 Industrial Law Journal 405.  
26 With the notable exceptions of O’Cinneide’s work on the EHRC and O’Briens work on ombudsmen 
which are referred to throughout the article.  Saggar has also published work on the EHRC but this 
focused on equality and economic regulation, whereas the present article focuses more broadly on 
equality and human rights in social regulation: S Saggar, ‘Regulation, Equality and the Public Interest’ 
(2008) 79(1) The Political Quarterly 82.  
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The article is divided into three sections.  The first section briefly explains the concept of 
regulatory space and justifies its use in relation to equality and human rights enforcement 
bodies.  The second section then examines and contrasts the roles of two of the major 
types of enforcement body (individual enforcement through the courts and sector-specific 
enforcers) particularly focusing on the enforcement tasks these bodies are unable, or ill-
suited, to fulfil and the enforcement spaces these create.  Through outlining these spaces, 
the final section constructs a strategic enforcement role for the Commission and illustrates 
how, building on the existing practices of the EHRC, this role can be accomplished.    
 
REGULATORY SPACE 
The concept of regulatory space was introduced by Hancher and Moran in the context of 
economic regulation to challenge the traditional orthodox hierarchical view of regulation.27  
This orthodox view regarded regulation as state enacted legal rules enforced by a single 
state regulator against private regulatees.28  In contrast, regulatory space attempts to 
capture the increasingly complex reality of regulation.  It uses the metaphor of space to 
recognise that regulation is an area available for occupation by different actors.  In this 
way, in divergence to the orthodox view, regulation is seen as not just consisting of a 
hierarchical relationship between a regulator and regulatees but also includes a wide 
range of other interested actors (eg individuals, charities, non-governmental 
organisations, state bodies) that also possess regulatory resources to various degrees.29  
                                                          
27 L Hancher and M Moran, ‘Organizing Regulatory Space’ in L Hancher and M Moran (eds), Capitalism, 
Culture, and Economic Regulation (Oxford: OUP, 1989) 277. 
28 C Scott, ‘Analysing regulatory space: fragmented resources and institutional design’ [2001] Public Law 
329, 332. 
29 ibid 330. 
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By using the concept of open space, Hancher and Moran recognise that the habitation of 
the regulatory field is open to dispute by different bodies so that the task of regulation is 
not necessarily evenly divided between actors and roles emerge via struggle (ie there will 
be major and minor participants in the regulatory process).30  This better fits modern 
experiences of regulation as it recognises that, rather than being concentrated in a single 
body, regulatory power and resources are increasingly being dispersed between different 
bodies.31  This dispersal of power and resources, and consequently the creation of 
regulatory space, is generally not a conscious deliberate act, it develops over time, on a 
piecemeal basis, as different governments alter the powers of different bodies and 
establish new bodies with new functions.32  Therefore, in order to understand regulation 
in a particular sector, investigators need to focus on the whole configuration of resources 
and relations within the shared regulatory space (ie the identity of the bodies within 
regulatory space, the roles they fulfil and the interactions between them).33  
 
Since the introduction of the concept of regulatory space by Hancher and Moran, 
regulatory theory has been expanded in two significant ways that are relevant to this 
article.  The first is the extension to public bodies.  Traditionally, regulatory theory focused 
on public bodies regulating private organisations, with regulation of public bodies by 
public bodies (where one public body seeks to change the behaviour of another public 
                                                          
30 L Hancher and M Moran, ‘Organizing Regulatory Space’ in L Hancher and M Moran (eds), Capitalism, 
Culture, and Economic Regulation (Oxford: OUP, 1989) 277.  
31 C Scott, ‘Analysing regulatory space: fragmented resources and institutional design’ [2001] Public Law 
329, 330. 
32 J Freeman and J Rossi, ‘Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space’ (2012) 125(5) Harvard Law 
Review 1131, 1143. 
33 C Scott, ‘Analysing regulatory space: fragmented resources and institutional design’ [2001] Public Law 
329, 330-331. 
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body) thought to be largely ineffective.34  More recently, work by Hood and colleagues 
has shown that regulation inside government is a big and diverse business and can be 
more effective than originally thought.35  This is important as, although enforcement of 
equality and human rights does involve public bodies regulating private organisations (eg 
the EHRC regulating employers), it also heavily involves public bodies regulating other 
public bodies (such as sector-specific enforcers regulating schools and hospitals).   
 
A second expansion of regulatory space has been its extension to social regulation.  The 
concept was originally introduced in the domain of economic regulation and its early uses 
were in this context,36 however, the concept’s increasing relevance to social regulation 
has been recognised.37  This ties in with the increasing trend in the regulation literature 
to expand the field of regulation to include social regulation.38  This has seen the use of 
regulatory space extended to areas of social regulation such as state contracting-out of 
public services and genetic databases.39  Thus, when the concept of regulatory space 
was originally devised, it was unlikely to be envisaged that it would be applicable to the 
enforcement of equality and human rights law.  Yet, the concept is particularly appropriate 
                                                          
34 J Q Wilson and P Rachal, ‘Can the government regulate itself?’ (1977) 46 Public Interest 3. 
35 C Hood and others, Regulation inside Government (Oxford: OUP, 1999).   
36  For instance it was utilised in relation to the regulation of accountants, telecommunications and 
utilities: J Young, ‘Outlining Regulatory Space: Agenda Issues at the FASB’ (1994) 19(1) Accounting 
Organisations and Society 83; C Hall, C Hood and C Scott, Telecommunications Regulation: Culture, 
Chaos and Interdependence Inside the Regulatory Process (Abingdon: Routledge, 1999); T Prosser, 
‘Theorising Utility Regulation’ (1999) 62(2) Modern Law Review 196.  
37 C Scott, ‘Analysing regulatory space: fragmented resources and institutional design’ [2001] Public Law 
329; J Freeman and J Rossi, ‘Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space’ (2012) 125(5) Harvard 
Law Review 1131. 
38 For example see C Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); T Prosser, The Regulatory Enterprise: Government, 
Regulation, and Legitimacy (Oxford: OUP, 2010).   
39 P Vincent-Jones, ‘The Regulation of Contractualisation in Quasi-Markets for Public Services’ [1999] 
Public Law 304; J Kaye and others, Governing Biobanks: Understanding the Interplay between Law and 
Practice (Oxford: Hart, 2012).   
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in the context of equality and human rights enforcement.  This is because it better 
captures the distinction in equality and human rights enforcement between ensuring 
compliance (conformity to legal rules) and promoting implementation (going beyond 
formal legal rules to mainstream equality and human rights).40  Traditionally, researchers 
have concentrated heavily on compliance through individual court enforcement and this 
has acted to obscure compliance and implementation through a wide range of others 
actors (such as the EHRC, sector-specific enforcers, NGOs, business groups, charities, 
companies and individuals).  Thus it is argued and will be illustrated throughout the article, 
that the concept of regulatory space better captures the reality of equality and human 
rights enforcement than solely focusing on the outcomes of individual enforcement in 
courts.   
 
THE REGULATORY SPACE OF EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
It was argued in the previous section that in order to effectively understand a regulatory 
space and hence regulation in a particular sector, there is a need to explore the roles of 
different bodies within regulatory space and to examine the relationships between these 
bodies.  Once the roles and relationships between regulatory bodies are visible, it is 
possible to make suggestions about how their capacities can be enhanced or constrained 
to re-adjust relations between them to improve regulation within the sector.  Therefore, 
this section of the article focuses on the roles of different bodies within the regulatory 
space of equality and human rights exploring the enforcement tasks they fulfil, and 
                                                          
40 P Hunt, ‘Configuring the UN Human Rights System in the “Era of Implementation”: Mainland and 
Archipelago’ (2017) 39 Human Rights Quarterly 489, 495-501. 
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crucially the tasks they are ill-suited or unable to perform.  Through undertaking this task, 
an enforcement role for the EHRC becomes visible.  While there is a range of actors 
within the regulatory space of equality and human rights (such as NGOs, business 
groups, charities, companies, and individuals) due to limits of space the article focuses 
on the three key actors within the shared regulatory space: individual enforcement 
through the courts, sector-specific enforcers, and the EHRC.   
 
Individual enforcement through the courts 
Both the Equality Act 2010 and the Human Rights Act 1998 recognise enforcement by 
individuals through judicial determination in courts and tribunals as the primary vehicle 
for enforcing equality and human rights claims.  Sections 114, 120 and 127 of the Equality 
Act 2010 grant jurisdiction to county courts and employment tribunals (the venue depends 
on the sector where discrimination occurs) to determine any alleged contraventions of the 
Act.  Sections 3, 4 and 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 give courts (and in some cases 
tribunals), respectively, powers to interpret legislation so far as it is possible to do so to 
ensure the legislation is compatible with Convention rights, issue a declaration of 
incompatibility when this is not possible and to hear claims brought by victims of alleged 
breaches by public authorities (as well as hearing claims advanced in other proceedings, 
such as using human rights as a defence in criminal proceedings).  
 
In contrast to the enforcement activities of public bodies that will be discussed later (ie 
sector-specific enforcers), enforcement by individuals through the courts has a number 
of advantages.  One key advantage is that public enforcement bodies just do not have 
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the resources to tackle every equality and human rights infringement and so enforcement 
by individuals can act to fill this gap.41  Additionally, even if public enforcement bodies 
could tackle every infringement, in many cases it would not be an efficient use of 
resources as individuals themselves are often in a better position to challenge breaches 
of the law due to their situated knowledge.  By allowing willing individuals to privately 
challenge infringements, the resources of public enforcers can be more effectively 
directed to where they are most needed.42  Furthermore, courts utilise more principled 
reasoning (they must give reasons for their decisions and try to be consistent and 
transparent); are likely to be more independent and impartial and have more expertise in 
terms of interpreting legal documents and dealing with conflicting claims, which provide 
greater legitimacy and gravitas to individual court decisions.43  Finally, a key advantage 
of enforcement by individuals is that it gives greater opportunity to the judiciary to 
elucidate (and in some cases expand) the law and reinforce important social values.44  
Consequently, judicial decisions have had an important impact on equality and human 
rights.  For example, in Ghaiden v Godin-Mendoza, the House of Lords used its powers 
under s 3 of the Human Rights Act to extend statutory tenancy inheritance rights under 
the Rent Act 1977 to same-sex couples even though this was not intended by parliament 
when the act was passed.45   
 
                                                          
41 J M Glover, ‘The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law’ (2012) 53 William 
and Mary Law Review 1137, 1153. 
42 S B Burbank, S Farhang and H M Kritzer, ‘Private Enforcement’ (2013) 17(3) Lewis & Clark Law 
Review 637, 663-4. 
43 D Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic 
Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 120-128; J King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2012) 61-63. 
44 K Yeung, ‘Privatizing Competition Regulation’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 581, 590. 
45 Ghaiden v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30.  
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Although the judicial determination of equality and human rights claims is important, solely 
relying on individuals to enforce equality and human rights through British courts is 
problematic as there are numerous equality and human rights enforcement tasks for 
which individual claims are ill-suited.  First, courts are limited to deciding the case before 
them and thus are generally unequipped to purposefully take more wide-ranging action.46  
This narrow case-specific focus often prevents court judgments tackling systemic issues 
and the root causes of equality and human rights breaches.47  Linked to this, courts are 
reliant on the information that the parties to the proceedings place before them and cannot 
engage in more wide-ranging factual enquiries, which provides a narrow evidence base 
on which to make decisions.48  Secondly, remedies are often quite narrow and judges are 
generally unwilling to provide more wide-ranging transformative remedies.49  On the 
occasions where courts do provide wider remedies, an additional problem is that courts 
are not best able to undertake monitoring and ensure their judgments are carried out.50 
 
                                                          
46 C R Kumar, ‘National Human Rights Institutions: Good Governance Perspectives on Institutionalization 
of Human Rights’ (2003) 19 American University International Law Review 259, 295. 
47 S Marks, ‘Human Rights and Root Causes’ (2011) 74(1) Modern Law Review 57.  This can be seen in 
Bellinger, where the House of Lords refused to extend marriage to transsexuals as it would represent a 
major change in the law, with far-reaching ramifications (Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21 [34]-[40]). 
48 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) paras 37-38.   
49  L Lustgarten, ‘Racial Inequality and the Limits of the Law’ (1986) 49(1) Modern Law Review 68, 73-4; 
N O’Brien, ‘Ombudsmen and social rights adjudication’ [2009] Public Law 466, 470; S Fredman, 
Discrimination Law (2nd edn, Oxford: OUP, 2011) 289. 
50  M McCann, Taking Reform Seriously: Perspectives on Public Interest Liberalism (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1986) 226; G Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 16.  The problematic nature of court monitoring was 
recognised by the House of Lords in Re S where their Lordships overturned a decision of the Court of 
Appeal which created a role of continued oversight for courts of local authority care plans under the 
Children Act 1989.  Lord Nicholls argued that in addition to departing substantially from a fundamental 
feature of the Act and thus crossing the boundary between interpretation and amendment, the oversight 
role for courts also created important practical repercussions for the local authorities which the court was 
not equipped to evaluate (Re S (Minors) (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan) [2002] UKHL 10 [40]-
[43]). 
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Third, enforcement via judicial determination is heavily hampered by individuation.  
Enforcement through the courts generally requires both an individual who has been 
harmed to bring a claim and there to be an identifiable defendant who can be blamed.51  
In many cases though, harmed individuals may be unable or unwilling to commence legal 
action.  In theory, anyone is entitled to access the court system, but in reality, litigation is 
time-consuming and costly, which acts as a barrier for many potential litigants.52  Even if 
there is a willing and able claimant, the complex nature of inequality and human rights 
means that there may be no individual or organisation that can readily be blamed resulting 
in the issue going unchallenged.53  Furthermore, in some cases individuals may not know 
they have been harmed, believing barriers to be normal or justified (eg a job advert that 
requires applicants to work full-time when in reality the job could be performed part-
time).54  Consequently, the situations in which equality and human rights issues can be 
judicially determined are actually quite narrow.   Finally, in order to hear equality and 
human rights claims courts are reliant on rights being justiciable, which in a dualist system 
such as the UK requires incorporation within domestic law.  Although courts can consider 
non-incorporated human rights when making their decisions, individuals cannot bring a 
claim based upon them.55  These limitations have caused commentators to label judicial 
                                                          
51  L Lustgarten, ‘Racial Inequality and the Limits of the Law’ (1986) 49(1) Modern Law Review 68, 72; C 
O’Cinneide, ‘The catalytic potential of equality and human rights commissions’ (2016) 24(1) Journal of 
Poverty and Social Justice 7, 8.   
52 T Hickman Public Law’s Disgrace (2017), available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/02/09/tom-
hickman-public-laws-disgrace/; D Brinks and V Gauri, ‘The Law’s Majestic Equality? The Distributive 
Impact of Judicializing Social and Economic Rights’ (2014) 12(2) Perspectives on Politics 375. 
53  In some instances of human rights infringements, there may be an individual/organisation at fault but 
they are not performing a public function under s 6 of the Human Rights Act so proceedings cannot be 
commenced against them under s 7: Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council 
v Wallbank and Another [2003] UKHL 37; YL v Birmingham City Council and others [2007] UKHL 27.  
54 S Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd edn, Oxford: OUP, 2011) 285-6. 
55 Al-Adsani v Government of Kuwait (1996) 107 ILR 536. 
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determination of equality and human rights as a ‘hollow hope’ or ‘like trying to etch figures 
in glass with a pick-axe’.56 
 
It should be noted that these constraints need not be fatal, with many commentators 
arguing that they can and should be overcome.  For instance, it would be possible to 
widen standing, make claims less financially risky for applicants and introduce a wider 
range of justiciable human rights.57   However, while accepting courts are not as effective 
as they could be, this article is focused on a different task.  While we should not give up 
on advocating greater access to justice through the courts, the reality is that even if there 
were substantial reforms to enhance individual enforcement mechanisms, there would 
still be enforcement gaps that courts could not fill (for example they could still not take the 
wide perspective of other bodies or adequately monitor remedies).  Consequently, there 
is a need to examine and contrast the enforcement role of other bodies (primarily sector-
specific enforcers and the EHRC) in the regulatory space of equality and human rights.   
 
Sector-specific enforcement 
Alongside the judiciary, sector-specific enforcers have also been given responsibility to 
address equality and human rights issues.  Under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 
1998, public authorities (which includes regulators, inspectorates, and ombudsmen) must 
                                                          
56  G Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991); L Lustgarten, ‘Racial Inequality and the Limits of the Law’ (1986) 49(1) Modern 
Law Review 68, 77. 
57  S Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford: OUP, 2008), ch 
5; T Hickman Public Law’s Disgrace (2017) available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/02/09/tom-
hickman-public-laws-disgrace/; K Boyle and El Hughes, ‘Identifying routes to remedy for violations of 
economic, social and cultural rights’ (2017) 22 The International Journal of Human Rights 43.  
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act in a way which is compatible with the rights contained within the European Convention 
on Human Rights.   Under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, public authorities must, 
when exercising their functions, have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, 
harassment and victimisation; advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations.  
Schedule 19 of the Equality Act 2010 specifically lists the majority of regulators, 
inspectorates, and ombudsmen as being subject to the duty.  Additionally, some enforcers 
are explicitly required to take equality and human rights concerns into account when 
discharging their functions.  For example, the Care Quality Commission (CQC) is required 
to have regard to the need to protect and promote the rights of people who use health 
and social care services.58  As a result of these provisions, sector-specific enforcers are 
required to take account of equality and human rights in their decisions and inspections.  
 
In terms of equality and human rights enforcement, sector-specific enforcers can 
overcome many of the limitations of (or fill the gaps left by) individual enforcement through 
the courts.  O’Brien outlines that in contrast to courts, ombudsmen are informal, free to 
both parties, relatively quick and more relaxed in terms of procedures and application of 
legal principles.59  Sector-specific enforcers are also able to offer greater flexibility in 
terms of remedies with their decisions generally being revisable and with them being able 
to draw upon their experiences to craft effective remedies with ‘systemic bite’.60  In 
addition, they are also better suited to continually monitor remedial action to correct 
                                                          
58  Health and Social Care Act 2008, s 4(d).  
59  N O’Brien, ‘Ombudsmen and social rights adjudication’ [2009] Public Law 466, 468.  Although it should 
be noted that ombudsmen are not without criticism (for example see C Hood and others, Regulation 
inside Government (Oxford: OUP, 1999) 89-90). 
60  ibid, 470. 
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equality/human rights abuses than courts.  This can be seen in the situation where a 
Health Trust was found to have failed in its care of a cancer patient that suffered a major 
fit and died, the Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsmen (PHSO) required the 
Trust to apologise to the patient’s wife and issue her compensation; draw up an action 
plan to address the learning points from the PHSO’s investigation and provide updates 
on certain aspects of the Trust’s work.61 
 
A further benefit of sector-specific enforcers is that while courts are reactive (only being 
able to hear complaints where there is both an individual who has been harmed and an 
individual who can be blamed), regulators and inspectorates are proactive.  By being 
vigilant for equality and human rights issues during inspections, sector-specific enforcers 
can tackle compliance concerns before anyone has been harmed by them.  Sector-
specific enforcement can also deal with situations where harm has occurred but 
individuals are not aware they have been harmed.  An illustration of this would be the joint 
monitoring of the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards in Wales by the Care and Social 
Services Inspectorate Wales and the Health Inspectorate Wales.  Under these 
safeguards, care homes and hospitals must apply to the relevant supervisory body for 
approval to deprive someone of their liberty.  Nevertheless, there is a danger that if the 
system is not working as required (eg supervisory organisations taking too long to make 
decisions and undertake reviews) that individuals can wrongfully be deprived of their 
liberty.  By highlighting the failings of the system (the latest report states that the system 
                                                          
61  PHSO Failure to provide appropriate care for a cancer patient who suffered a major fit and died (2015) 
available at https://www.ombudsman.org.uk/about-us/how-our-casework-makes-difference/case-
summaries/1079. 
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is struggling to cope and is unfit for purpose), the joint report aims to encourage state 
action before further human rights infringements occur, and thus bypass relying on 
vulnerable individuals to commence legal proceedings once they have been harmed.62 
 
A final advantage of sector-specific enforcement over judicial determination is that it is 
much easier for sector-specific enforcers to incorporate non-justiciable rights into their 
work and hence give them effect.  Thus, while individuals cannot directly assert their rights 
under the UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child and the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities in British courts, the CQC incorporates these standards into its enforcement 
work, thus giving the rights real substance within the health and social care sector.63  
 
Although sector-specific enforcement can overcome many of the limitations of equality 
and human rights enforcement connected with judicial determination, enforcement by 
regulators, inspectorates and ombudsmen has a number of restrictions.  First, its sector-
specific nature makes a uniform enforcement approach difficult.  Disparities in 
enforcement can occur because different enforcers have adopted varying interpretations 
of the requirements of equality and human rights or because one enforcer places much 
greater weight on equality and human rights than another enforcer.  This makes it difficult 
for those subject to enforcement to adopt a consistent organisational approach to equality 
and human rights as many regulatees operate in different sectors and thus will be subject 
to competing equality and human rights requirements by different enforcers.  Enforcement 
                                                          
62  Care and Social Services Inspectorate Wales and Health Inspectorate Wales, ‘Deprivation of Liberty 
Safeguards: Annual Monitoring Report for Health and Social Care 2015-16’ (CSSIW and HIW 2016).  
63  Care Quality Commission, ‘Human rights approach for our regulation of health and social care 
services’ (CQC 2014) 14-15.  
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by multiple enforcers can also result in equality and human rights concerns being 
overlooked as one enforcer believes another enforcer is tackling those issues.   
 
A further restriction is that most sector-specific enforcers have very limited knowledge of 
the requirements of equality and human rights law.  While equality and human rights 
issues may be prominent in the specific sector, the primary role of sector-specific 
enforcers is not equality and human rights enforcement.  The staff at each enforcer are 
appointed for their skills and expertise related to the primary role and therefore will 
generally lack knowledge about equality and human rights requirements.  
Consequentially, however willing they may be, the lack of legal knowledge makes it 
difficult for sector-specific enforcers to enforce equality and human rights issues within 
their work.  This was seen in a report by the Office for Public Management (OPM) into the 
role and experience of sector-specific enforcers in incorporating human rights into their 
work, which found that while there was commitment to human rights at an organisational 
level, at an individual level knowledge was very limited, with individuals unsure of the 
content of human rights, the requirements of the Human Rights Act, and the relevance of 
human rights to their day-to-day roles.64  
 
A final limitation, linked to sector-specific enforcers’ lack of knowledge about equality and 
human rights, is the distance of enforcers from judicial determinations.  Given that equality 
and human rights enforcement is not their primary role, sector-specific enforcers are less 
likely to keep up to date with current equality and human rights jurisprudence.  Thus, the 
                                                          
64  Office for Public Management, The role and experience of inspectorates, regulators and complaints-
handling bodies in promoting human rights standards in public services (EHRC 2009) 21.  
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OPM report also found that respondents varied in the extent that they felt that they should 
keep up to date with human rights jurisprudence and their awareness of how they could 
do this.65  Not keeping up to date with the law can potentially lead to sector-specific 
enforcers overlooking clear breaches of the law or accidentally encouraging those subject 
to enforcement to engage in unlawful actions.  This is especially so given that the majority 
of OPM respondents lacked awareness of whether changes in human rights law fed back 
into the enforcers’ policies and practices.66  The proximity of enforcers to those subject to 
their enforcement mean that regulatees are much more likely to follow the requirements 
of enforcers than formal legal requirements (of which they may have little knowledge or 
understanding).67  This disconnect between sector-specific enforcer practice and current 
jurisprudence significantly hampers effective equality and human rights enforcement.  
 
In summary, sector-specific enforcers can fulfil some of the enforcement gaps left by the 
courts (they can deal with equality and human rights issues beyond a specific individual 
case, they can provide wider remedies, do not generally require specific individuals to 
claim/be blamed which means they can be proactive and can more easily deal with 
unincorporated rights).  However, there are also numerous drawbacks to sector-specific 
enforcement (ie enforcement disparities between enforcers, an overall lack of knowledge 
of equality and human rights standards and significant distance from formal court 
decisions).  As with individual enforcement through the courts, the limitations of sector-
specific enforcement do not have to be fatal to the effective protection of equality and 
                                                          
65  ibid 33. 
66  ibid. 
67  ibid 58. 
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human rights law, as the EHRC still has a role to play in the shared regulatory space of 
equality and human rights.  It is to this role that the rest of the article now turns.  
 
THE ROLE OF THE EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION 
The previous section outlined the roles of two types of key actors (individual enforcement 
through the courts and sector-specific enforcers) within the regulatory space of equality 
and human rights.  As was outlined in the first section, once an understanding of the roles 
of actors within regulatory space is gained, effective regulation is achieved by enhancing 
or constraining the capacities of different bodies.  Yet, in relation to the enforcement of 
equality and human rights, the roles of individual enforcement through courts and sector-
specific enforcers are unlikely to be enhanced and if anything, are more likely to be 
constrained (eg if the Human Rights Act is repealed without being replaced).  Therefore, 
the positions of courts and sector-specific enforcers within the regulatory space of equality 
and human rights are largely fixed.  This makes the role of the EHRC within the regulatory 
space take on added importance, as its wide-ranging powers mean that it can adopt an 
enforcement role as wide (such as re-inspecting all regulatees already inspected by 
sector-specific enforcers) or as narrow (only issuing guidance to actors) as necessary to 
fill the enforcement gaps.  
 
Given the concerns with the performance of the EHRC, it is important that the 
Commission adopts an effective role for itself within the regulatory space of equality law 
and human rights, to avoid having its capacities further constrained by the Government. 
It was seen in the previous section that the courts and sector-specific enforcers discharge 
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a number of key enforcement tasks (eg the courts elucidate and expand the law and 
sector-specific enforcers tackle potential harm before it occurs).  Both bodies are also 
able to carry out some tasks that the other body is unable to successfully complete (for 
example courts can adopt a consistent approach to the law that applies across different 
sectors and sector-specific enforcers can utilise non-incorporated rights in their 
enforcement work thereby giving them effect in Britain).  However, there are still a number 
of tasks that are not effectively performed by either the courts or sector-specific enforcers 
(such as wide-ranging monitoring of the effectiveness of the law across society) and 
constraints on the abilities of both to act effectively that are not always corrected by the 
other type of body (such as difficulties of individuals accessing a court and sector-specific 
enforcers lacking knowledge of equality and human rights standards).  Through these 
observations it is possible to outline an effective role for the EHRC that consists of three 
primary tasks: (1) carrying out enforcement action that courts and sector-specific 
enforcers are unable to perform; (2) overcoming some of the limitations of individual 
enforcement via the courts; and (3) coordinating and supporting sector-specific enforcers.  
The remainder of the article will now expand on these tasks and illustrate how they can 
effectively be performed by the Commission.   
 
1. Carrying out enforcement action that courts and sector-specific 
enforcers are unable to perform 
The first key aspect of the EHRC’s role is undertaking enforcement action that courts and 
sector-specific enforcers are unable to perform.  The Commission can use its full range 
of powers to fulfil this role, but particularly useful are the powers of monitoring (on both 
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the effectiveness of equality and human rights law and progress in society) and ability to 
launch inquiries to compensate for the limitations of enforcement via judicial 
determination and sector-specific enforcement, primarily by taking enforcement action at 
a society-wide level (or at least at a multi-sector level).68  Whereas courts are limited to 
the issue before them so cannot tackle systemic issues and, sector-specific enforcers can 
only focus on issues within their sector which means they may miss or inconsistently 
tackle multi-sector issues, the EHRC can highlight and tackle equality and rights concerns 
at a societal level.  The Commission has recognised the importance of this task (with it 
being one of its principles for prioritising issues) and has taken a number of actions to 
tackle societal and cross-sector issues.69  One key programme of work is monitoring, with 
the Commission constructing a monitoring framework and undertaking triennial reviews 
to assess the state of equality and human rights implementation in Britain.70  Although 
there are other actors that could undertake aspects of this monitoring work (such as 
sector-specific enforcers and civil society organisations), the EHRC is uniquely placed to 
take a detailed and pan-societal approach to monitoring.   
 
Another key mechanism for the Commission to undertake unique enforcement actions is 
through inquiries.  For example, it has undertaken an inquiry into disability-related 
harassment.71  While it is possible for individuals to challenge the harassment they have 
experienced through the courts and sector-specific enforcers to address harassment 
                                                          
68 The Commission could also use some of its other powers here such as investigations (although 
inquiries are much wider and therefore likely to prove more cost effective) and providing information 
(which is often follows monitoring and inquiries).   
69 EHRC, Strategic Plan: 2016-19 (EHRC 2016) 5. 
70 EHRC, Is Britain Fairer? The state of equality and human rights 2015 (EHRC 2015).   
71 EHRC, Hidden in plain sight: Inquiry into disability-related harassment (EHRC 2011).  
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within their sector, both bodies are unable to capture the wide-ranging and systemic 
nature of this harassment, with the EHRC being in a much better position to investigate 
concerns.  In addition, the EHRC is undertaking work to ensure equality and human rights 
are protected after the UK leaves the EU.72  Although judicial determination and sector-
specific enforcers could address aspects of this work they are unable to take the broad 
and uniform approach that the EHRC can.  Furthermore, there are situations where 
neither the courts (because there is no organisation with alleged responsibility) or sector-
specific enforcers (because there is no relevant sector-specific enforcer) can take action, 
and thus the EHRC is best placed to act.  This can be seen with the Commission’s inquiry 
into diversity on FTSE 350 boardrooms, where although there is a lack of diversity there 
is often no obvious act of discrimination that can be challenged in a court and there is no 
sector-specific enforcer.73  
 
While the Commission has begun to carry out enforcement actions that courts and sector-
specific enforcers have been unable to perform, its work in this area has been hampered 
by the significant budget cuts that it has endured, which has meant that the Commission 
has had to seriously change the way it operates.  Thus, the threshold for conducting 
inquiries has now been set at a high level so they will be undertaken much less 
frequently.74  However, budgetary cuts have also had some advantages on how the 
Commission conducts inquiries.  For instance, the EHRC has significantly streamlined its 
                                                          
72 EHRC, ‘Healing the divisions: A positive vision for equality and human rights in Britain’ (EHRC 2017).  
73 EHRC, An inquiry into fairness, transparency and diversity in FTSE 350 board appointments (EHRC 
2016). This can also be seen in the Commission’s investigation into the Metropolitan Police: EHRC, 
‘Section 20 investigation into the Metropolitan Police Service’ (EHRC 2016).  
74 EHRC, ‘Phase 2 consultation response on our Strategic Plan 2012-15’ (EHRC 2012) 14. 
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monitoring framework making it easier and less costly to undertake the triennial review.  
Prior to having its budget cut, the Commission had four different measurement 
frameworks: the Equality Measurement Framework for Adults; the Children’s 
Measurement Framework; the Good Relations Measurement Framework and the Human 
Rights Measurement Framework.75  In total these four frameworks consisted of 198 
indicators which made reporting on them ‘onerous and unmanageable’.76  Consequently, 
the new measurement framework is much more specific and focused consisting of 
eighteen core indicators (which will be reported on every three years) and seven 
supplementary indicators (which will be reported on every nine years) making the task of 
monitoring much more achievable and significantly easier to communicate to 
stakeholders.77   
 
In relation to inquiries, budget cuts have forced the Commission to place greater 
emphasis on multi-agency working, working cooperatively with a range of organisations, 
in particular, sector-specific enforcers.  Prior to the budget cuts, in two of its early inquiries, 
the EHRC explored recruitment and employment in the meat and poultry processing 
sector and human rights in the home care of older people.  Both inquiries had significant 
overlap with the remit of sector-specific enforcers (the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
                                                          
75 S Alkire and others, Developing the Equality Measurement Framework: Selecting the indicators (EHRC 
2009); H Holder, T Tsang and P Vizard, Developing the Children’s Measurement Framework: Selecting 
the indicators (EHRC 2011); A Wigfield and R Turner, Good Relations Measurement Framework (EHRC 
2010); J Candler and others, Human Rights Measurement Framework: Prototype panels, indicator set 
and evidence base (EHRC 2011).   
76 EHRC, Measurement Framework for Equality and Human Rights (EHRC 2017) 22. 
77 EHRC, Measurement Framework for Equality and Human Rights (EHRC 2017) 27-9. 
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in the former and the Care Quality Commission (CQC) in the latter).78  In both inquiries, 
neither the HSE or CQC were given key roles and the EHRC merely replicated work for 
which both enforcers had responsibility.  In the period after its budget was cut the 
Commission has recognised the need to use its remaining budget effectively by acting 
strategically and avoiding duplication and has thus placed significant weight on 
partnership with sector-specific enforcers (discussed in more detail below).79  Since this 
change in approach the only inquiry that the EHRC has undertaken where sector-specific 
enforcers also had enforcement power was a cross-sector inquiry (which, as outlined 
earlier, no sector-specific enforcer could adequately address individually) on preventing 
deaths in detention of adults with mental health conditions, and all relevant sector-specific 
enforcers were involved in the inquiry.80  Thus in relation to this aspect of the 
Commission’s role, the approach of the EHRC would appear to conform with the findings 
of Sarah Spencer and Colin Harvey’s wider study of UK and Irish equality and human 
rights institutions that while resources ‘are essential to carry out some functions; hence, 
the budget has a bearing on performance…a tight budget can encourage a strategic use 
of the levers available’.81  This would appear to be the case here as while large budget 
cuts have restricted the Commission’s ability to act which has curtailed its enforcement 
potential (for example, budget cuts have restricted the number of inquiries the EHRC can 
undertake), it has caused the Commission to act more strategically.  The EHRC has done 
                                                          
78  EHRC, Inquiry into recruitment and employment in the meat and poultry processing sector: Report of 
the findings and recommendations (EHRC 2010); EHRC, Close to home: An inquiry into older people and 
human rights in home care (EHRC 2011).  
79 EHRC, Strategic Plan Revision for 2015/16 (EHRC 2015) 6. 
80 EHRC, Preventing Deaths in Detention of Adults with Mental Health Conditions: An Inquiry by the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC 2015).  
81 S Spencer and C Harvey, ‘Context, institution or accountability? Exploring the factors that shape the 
performance of national human rights and equality bodies’ (2014) 42(1) Policy & Politics 89, 102. 
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this by focusing its enforcement actions to ensure they are as effective as they can be, 
through streamlining its monitoring mechanisms and engaging in multi-agency working.  
Given the Commission is uniquely placed to fulfil these enforcement activities (particularly 
undertaking inquiries), additional government funding for the EHRC would be justified for 
these activities.  Alongside this though, the Commission should continue to focus its 
resources on these enforcement actions, particularly ensuring maximum value for money 
by cooperating with other relevant bodies to increase the effectiveness of the overall 
enforcement regime.82     
 
2. Overcoming some of the limitations of individual enforcement via the 
courts 
It was seen earlier that there are number of limitations to individual enforcement through 
the courts, this sub-section explores how the EHRC can use its powers to overcome, or 
at least minimise, some of these limitations.  Within the shared regulatory space of 
equality and human rights, individuals via courts and the EHRC have been given distinct 
but closely related roles.  The courts and the EHRC can work independently without a 
failure of the equality and human rights enforcement regime, but enforcement will be most 
effective when they cooperate.  Through judicial determination of equality and human 
rights claims, courts can provide the EHRC with important legal frameworks, which the 
Commission can utilise to improve the protection and promotion of equality and human 
                                                          
82 J Freeman and J Rossi, ‘Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space’ (2012) 125(5) Harvard Law 
Review 1131, 1182.   
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rights.83  The EHRC, in turn, can utilise its powers to work with courts to overcome some 
of the limitations of judicial determination and thus improve the ability of courts to hear 
equality and human rights cases.  As already outlined a potential limitation of individual 
enforcement via the courts is difficulties with access to the courts.  The Commission can 
overcome this limitation by utilising its powers to provide advice to individuals where they 
believe their rights have been breached, they can also provide legal assistance in specific 
equality cases, or institute legal proceedings themselves.84  Additionally, while courts are 
typically limited in the information they have before them, the Commission can use its 
power to intervene in legal proceedings to provide information to courts to improve the 
evidence basis that courts have before them when making decisions.   
 
In terms of the relationship between courts and the EHRC, interaction takes place solely 
in the courtroom when the EHRC either institute or intervene in legal proceedings. This 
results in the courts and the EHRC being in a principal-agent relationship, with the court 
as the principal and the EHRC as the agent.85  As the principal, the courts exert 
considerable control over the EHRC within their shared regulatory space, determining if 
it can institute/intervene in legal proceedings, the extent of the Commission’s intervention 
and the weight placed upon the Commission’s submissions.  As an agent, to play an 
effective enforcement role, the EHRC needs to comply with the wishes of the court.  In a 
                                                          
83  C R Kumar, ‘National Human Rights Institutions: Good Governance Perspectives on Institutionalization 
of Human Rights’ (2003) 19 American University International Law Review 259, 295; EHRC, ‘Can you 
help us to help others?’ (EHRC 2018).   
84  A strategic litigation approach was a significant tool for the EHRC’s predecessors: C O’Cinneide, ‘The 
Commission for Equality and Human Rights: A New Institution for New and Uncertain Times’ (2007) 36(2) 
Industrial Law Journal 141, 149-150.  
85 G Stoker, ‘Governance as theory: five propositions’ (1998) 50(155) International Social Science Journal 
17, 22; J Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 
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study of interventions in the Supreme Court of Canada, Alarie and Green outline three 
functions interventions can serve: (i) providing objectively useful information to the court; 
(ii) providing the ‘best’ argument for certain partisan interests; and (iii) allowing interveners 
to have their voices heard.86  As an agent, to positively influence judicial determinations 
on equality and human rights issues, the EHRC needs to fulfil the needs of the courts.  
The courts are concerned with resolving the direct legal dispute and therefore want the 
EHRC in its interventions to fulfil the first function (ie provide objectively useful 
information).  As Baroness Hale states, ‘interveners are, or should be there to provide us 
with evidence and arguments with which, for whatever reason, the parties are unlikely or 
unable to provide us, so that…we can get a more rounded picture of the problem’.87  
Therefore, if the EHRC is to work effectively with the courts, it needs to fulfil the first 
function of interveners and provide the courts with objectively useful information.  
 
There are two main obstacles that currently inhibit the Commission overcoming some of 
the constraints of judicial enforcement through the courts.  The first, seen in the previous 
part, is the impact of the heavy budget cuts.  This has meant the EHRC, in its second 
iteration under the chairship of Onora O’Neill, became much less ambitious, only using 
its legal powers as a last resort.88  Consequently, the Commission moved away from 
providing legal advice and legal assistance, recognising that there were other 
                                                          
86  B Alarie and A Green, ‘Interventions at the Supreme Court of Canada: Accuracy, Affiliation, and 
Acceptance’ (2010) 48 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 381, 381. 
87 Baroness Hale of Richmond, ‘Who Guards the Guardians?’ (2014) 3(1) Cambridge Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 100, 110. 
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organisations in society who provided these services and instead placed increased 
emphasis on (the more cost-effective) intervention in ongoing legal proceedings.89   
 
The second obstacle, relating to interventions, is that the EHRC is not currently 
performing the task it has been allotted by the courts.  By examining cases where the 
EHRC has intervened it can be seen that, while courts want the Commission to provide 
objectively useful information, the Commission is instead providing the best argument for 
partisan interests.90  Thus, Baroness Hale argues that ‘from the point of view of the court 
it can sometimes be difficult to disentangle the private interests of the client from the 
broader public interests of the Commission’.91  This can often put courts and the EHRC 
into conflict resulting in courts often ignoring, or placing limited weight, upon the 
Commission’s interventions.  For example, in Slack, the appeals took on a more 
complicated form due to the issues being transformed by the intervention of the EHRC 
who introduced a range of fresh legal arguments.92  In Bracking (No. 2) the EHRC tried 
to encourage the judge to read a report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human 
Rights, yet the judge refrained as it did not sound particularly useful, it was unlikely to 
help decide the issues in the case and there was a very real danger of infringing the rules 
                                                          
89 EHRC, ‘Business Plan 2016/17’ (EHRC 2016) 16-17.  
90 It should be noted that this is a trend and not a rule and that there are examples of cases that do not 
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on Parliamentary privilege.93  Finally in Smith the EHRC was criticised by Lord Collins in 
the Supreme Court for encouraging the judge in an earlier stage of the proceedings to 
answer a question which, although the Commission deemed it of general significance and 
importance, was academic to the facts of the case: ‘There is an obvious danger in giving 
what are in substance advisory opinions on hypothetical facts divorced from any concrete 
factual situation’.94   
 
Consequently, in order to be more successful in this area, rather than providing the best 
arguments for partisan interests, the Commission needs to focus on providing courts with 
objectively useful information.  This is particularly important in light of section 87 of the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, which requires interveners to pay some or all of 
the parties’ costs (unless there are exceptional circumstances) if the intervener has acted 
in substance as the main party, the intervener’s evidence and representations have not 
been of significant assistance to the court or a significant part relates to matters that are 
not necessary for the court to consider, or the intervener has behaved unreasonably.  
Therefore, rather than just having its interventions ignored, the EHRC could now find that 
there are significant cost implications if it continues with its current approach, reducing its 
budget even further.  
 
                                                          
93 R. (Aspinall) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v The Equality and Human Rights 
Commission [2014] EWHC 4134, paras 119-122.  This can also be seen in H: H v Commissioner of 
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Given that the Commission is wanting to obtain favourable rulings from courts to help with 
its other enforcement activities (such as promoting greater compliance and 
implementation) it is perhaps unreasonable to expect it to fulfil the implementation role 
desired by courts and provide objectively useful information.  Consequently, rather than 
intervening in cases, if the EHRC is going to continue to advance their own partisan 
interests, it would be better to focus on providing legal assistance or instituting 
proceedings itself.  The third iteration of the Commission (under the chairship of David 
Isaacs) is working towards this and expanding the number of cases it assists, which 
should be encouraged.95  However, a limitation in this area is that the Commission is only 
able to provide legal assistance for equality claims and not human rights claims.  This 
might not seem particularly problematic because the EHRC can institute human rights 
claims in its own name, yet this is far from ideal in situations where there is a willing but 
poorly resourced applicant, as it forces the Commission to take over the applicant’s case, 
which acts to take control and autonomy away from the victim, further disempowering 
them.  Consequently, the EHRC would benefit from having its powers to provide legal 
assistance extended to also cover human rights to avoid these sorts of situation.   
 
3. Coordinating and supporting sector-specific enforcers 
In relation to the EHRC and sector-specific enforcers, the powers of both mean they are 
engaged in a redundancy model of enforcement with both possessing overlapping 
                                                          
95 D Isaac Prioritising our legal work (2017), available at https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/our-
work/blogs/prioritising-our-legal-work; EHRC Legal Support Project: helping people to get legal 
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functions.96  This means that both the EHRC and sector-specific enforcers can take 
identical enforcement action, such as publish information, issue codes of practice, 
undertake investigations and assess compliance with the public sector equality duty.  
However, given the wide-ranging nature of equality and human rights regulation and the 
Commission’s reduced budget, it would be impossible for the EHRC to regulate all 
organisations in society.  Consequently, rather than simply repeating the enforcement 
actions of sector-specific enforcers, to be most effective the EHRC would benefit from 
using its powers in this area to overcome the limitations of sector-specific enforcement – 
ie attempt to share knowledge with enforcers to build up their equality and human rights 
capabilities, support enforcers in enforcement and try to ensure conformity between 
enforcers in different sectors.  This means that the relationships between the Commission 
and sector-specific enforcers in regulatory space are particularly important.   
 
In a similar model to the courts and the EHRC, the Commission could enter into a 
principal-agent relationship with sector-specific enforcers, with the Commission as 
principal and enforcers as agents.  Under this relationship, the Commission would recruit 
enforcers and seek to control them in order to ensure that they carry out the EHRC’s 
enforcement work within their sector.  Yet it is likely that such arrangements would have 
only limited success as it is now widely recognised that classic models of control such as 
principal-agent are not the most effective way of achieving regulatory aims.  This is 
because the principal imposes arbitrary standards externally on agents, without taking 
into account the specifics of the agents, their capacities and the context in which they 
                                                          
96 C Scott, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ (2000) 27(1) Journal of Law and Society 38, 52. 
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operate.97  Instead of models of control within a shared regulatory space, a more 
cooperative approach is needed where enforcement bodies learn about the capacities of 
themselves and each other to take more effective action.98  Thus the EHRC learns about 
sector-specific enforcers and how best to share knowledge with, support and coordinate 
the actions of different enforcers and at the same time sector-specific enforcers learn how 
to develop knowledge and work with the Commission and other sector-specific enforcers.  
 
Lenoble and Maesschalck outline four approaches to learning, all of which operate on a 
continuum, progressively expanding the conditions for the success of learning.99  The 
attainment of maximum learning requires a combination of all four approaches.100  The 
first approach is neo-institutionalist, which rather than imposing arbitrary external 
conditions on organisations, requires that the external conditions that are imposed are 
optimal (ie the most effective they can be).101  For the EHRC and sector-specific enforcers 
this would mean that, rather than imposing the Commission’s preferred method of 
enforcement on sector-specific enforcers and expecting enforcers to carry this out, the 
Commission instead considers which methods of enforcement would be the ‘best fit’ for 
                                                          
97 J Lenoble and M Maesschalck, ‘Renewing the Theory of Public Interest: The Quest for a Reflexive and 
Learning-based Approach to Governance’ in O De Schutter and J Lenoble (eds), Reflexive Governance: 
Redefining the Public Interest in a Pluralistic World (Oxford: Hart, 2010) 10.  
98 C Scott, ‘Reflexive Governance, Regulation and Meta-Regulation: Control or Learning? in O De 
Schutter and J Lenoble (eds), Reflexive Governance: Redefining the Public Interest in a Pluralistic World 
(Oxford: Hart, 2010) 47.  
99 J Lenoble and M Maesschalck, ‘Renewing the Theory of Public Interest: The Quest for a Reflexive and 
Learning-based Approach to Governance’ in O De Schutter and J Lenoble (eds), Reflexive Governance: 
Redefining the Public Interest in a Pluralistic World (Oxford: Hart, 2010) 8. 
100 P Vincent-Jones, ‘Embedding Economic Relationships through Social Learning? The Limits of Patient 
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215, 221. 
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each sector-specific enforcer to achieve compliance and promote implementation within 
their sector.  The Commission would then learn from the performance of sector-specific 
enforcers how the methods of enforcement and ‘fit’ of these to particular enforcers could 
be improved in the future.  Although expanding on principal-agent and control approaches 
to cooperation, the neo-institutionalist approach is not sufficient on its own to establish 
full learning as the approach does not ensure that those who apply the conditions (ie 
sector-specific enforcers) do so in the same spirit as those who imposed the conditions 
(ie the EHRC) and thus the effects may be different from those envisaged.   
 
Consequently, the second approach is deliberative and builds on the neo-institutionalist 
approach by recognising that organisations that implement externally imposed conditions 
are affected in how they enact those conditions by their own internal mechanisms and 
thus there is a need to act on these mechanisms to improve implementation.  
Consequently, under the deliberative approach learning takes place through different 
actors sharing their unique perspectives about the best way to undertake collective 
action.102  This would involve the EHRC and sector-specific enforcers engaging in 
discussions about how sector-specific enforcers could best incorporate equality and 
human rights considerations into their work.  In this way, both the Commission and 
enforcers learn about enforcement within specific sectors.  Nevertheless, learning is still 
constrained as deliberation takes place within pre-determined power dynamics and actors 
often lack the capacities to effectively engage in deliberation.  With some sector-specific 
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enforcers (perhaps those that lack confidence around equality and human rights or that 
are newly created) it is likely that the EHRC will dominate discussions as enforcers will 
lack the capacities (such as knowledge, experience, confidence and resources) to 
engage in discussions on equal terms.  However, in other cases (perhaps where 
enforcers are large and long-established) it is likely that the enforcer will dominate 
discussions and the Commission will lack capacities (eg tradition and reputation) to fully 
engage in discussions.  In both situations, deliberation will be inhibited by unequal power 
dynamics.   
 
The third, pragmatic approach aims to overcome the restrictions of the deliberative 
approach.  It does this by encouraging actors to engage in a process of joint inquiry – 
thus discussions are truly open and all organisations contribute to, and should learn from, 
the inquiry.  All actors are involved in designing solutions, monitoring performance and 
adjusting solutions accordingly.  The process is experimentalist as new solutions create 
new problems so learning is a continuous process where there is permanent revisions 
and testing.103  This would require the EHRC and sector-specific enforcers to jointly 
consider how equality and human rights could best be enforced within a specific sector, 
to jointly design methods of enforcement and to jointly assess the success of these 
methods.  On the basis of this process, both the Commission and the enforcers would 
learn about different methods and improve their approaches in future.  Yet, even if actors 
are equal partners in deliberation, they can still lack the capacities to engage in the joint 
                                                          
103 C F Sabel and J Cohen, ‘Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy’ (1997) 3 European Law Journal 313; C F 
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inquiry in reality. Thus, other proponents of the pragmatist approach argue that the pre-
existing frames need also to be questioned.104  Actors need to be made aware that when 
they engage in joint action they bring ‘baggage’ with them which inhibits their ability to 
learn.  This ‘baggage’ includes past experiences, past discussions, beliefs and biases 
which can (often unconsciously) influence how actors view ‘facts’, understand situations 
and assess solutions which restricts what can be achieved.  Thus, actors should not only 
engage in joint action but also agree on the framing of issues (eg what are the problems, 
what are possible solutions, what are the challenges) to more effectively learn and thus 
increase their success.  However, the problem of the pragmatist approach is that it 
assumes knowledge of the limitations of framing is sufficient to encourage actors to 
reframe issues. 
 
The final approach, the genetic approach, argues that knowledge of the problems of 
framing are insufficient to induce actors to overcome them.  Instead, conditions must be 
put in place that encourage actors to question their representations and the role that they 
play and construct a new identity that the context requires.  Actors should achieve this by 
learning from their past (by considering what specific identities were taken in the past and 
what capacities contributed to these identities) and then re-imagining ways to act 
collectively in the future that are not constrained by the existing frames.105  In this way 
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actors are truly free to learn without constraints and thus can most effectively engage in 
joint inquiries to tackle collective problems.   
 
In order to successfully coordinate and support sector-specific enforcers, the EHRC 
needs to facilitate mutual learning, where sector-specific enforcers learn how to best 
incorporate equality and human rights into their work and the Commission learns how 
best to support and coordinate enforcers.  As outlined above, learning is optimised under 
the genetic approach to learning.  In the absence of detailed empirical work exploring 
interactions between the EHRC and enforcers, it is not possible to outline which 
approaches actors are currently undertaking and how they could move along the 
continuum to deeper approaches to learning.  Instead, a few outline observations will be 
shared.    
 
The Commission does appear to have moved away from the principal-agent model of 
cooperation and moved towards more learning based approaches, and aspects of the 
neo-institutionalist, deliberative and pragmatist approaches can all be observed.  In the 
first two strategic plans, although speaking of cooperation, the Commission outlined how 
it would work ‘with and through’ existing sector-specific enforcers suggesting that 
enforcers were a means to an end (ie they would be used to reach a wider range of 
organisations) and of helping enforcers fulfil ‘their own obligations’ strongly suggesting 
that incorporating equality and human rights into their work is something that enforcers 
are obliged to do.106  In the more recent strategies (2015-16 and 2016-19) there is a 
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softening of language with talk of collaborating with sector-specific enforcers to embed 
equality and human rights into their approaches to improve public services.107  This 
demonstrates a move away from control approaches and has been supplemented with 
models of working that encourage learning.   For instance, the EHRC’s 2014-15 Business 
Plan spoke of testing and disseminating models for embedding equality and human rights 
inspection work to enforcers which suggests a neo-institutionalist approach (where the 
best external models are imposed on enforcers).108  The Commission also chairs a 
regulator, inspectorate and ombudsmen (RIO) forum which meets quarterly to share 
knowledge and experiences around human rights and equality practices.  This resulted 
in a report being produced that promotes the best practice of different enforcers.109  This 
would be an illustration of the deliberative approach to learning where enforcers discuss 
ways to address a shared goal (ensuring greater compliance with and implementation of 
equality and human rights).    
 
The Commission has also begun to establish relationships with individual enforcers, 
although the relationships between the EHRC and specific enforcers vary.  For example, 
while the Commission intended to have a close working relationship with the school’s 
regulator, Ofsted, a memorandum of understanding has not been concluded between the 
two organisations and Ofsted makes little or no reference to equality and human rights 
law and standards in its inspection literature.110  This is despite equality and human rights 
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being intrinsic to Ofsted’s inspection framework (eg the right to education, the right for 
children to express their views, freedom of expression).  In contrast, the EHRC has a 
close working relationship with the Care Quality Commission (CQC).  The EHRC has 
entered into a memorandum of understanding through which the CQC and the EHRC 
committed to work together to improve equality and human rights in health and adult 
social care services.111  This has resulted in the Commission and CQC issuing joint 
guidance on equality and human rights for CQC inspectors and assessors which outlines 
what equality and human rights issues inspectors should consider when inspecting 
different aspects of the inspection framework.112  The EHRC has also funded equality and 
human rights training for all CQC staff provided by the British Institute of Human Rights.113  
This suggests a more pragmatic approach to learning where both the EHRC and CQC 
engage in joint inquiries (ie how best to embed equality and human rights into CQC 
inspection frameworks and to train inspectors and assessors).  As stated above, this 
needs to be explored empirically, but it does suggest that the Commission is beginning 
to engage in activities that facilitate learning and thus improve the capacity of some, if not 
all, enforcers to embed equality and human rights considerations into their work, and this 
is something that should be extended by the EHRC in the future.    
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CONCLUSION 
The article began by arguing that the metaphor of regulatory space could be utilised to 
capture the reality of equality and human rights enforcement.  Through the use of 
regulatory space, the roles of two key types of enforcement body (courts through 
individual enforcement and sector-specific enforcers) were explored, particularly focusing 
on the enforcement tasks that both bodies are unable, or ill-suited, to fulfil.  It was seen 
when examining the role of courts that, although their decisions have greater legitimacy 
and they are in a better position to elucidate/expand the law, there are certain 
enforcement tasks they are ill-suited to perform including dealing with equality and human 
rights issues beyond the immediate case, providing wide-ranging transformative 
remedies, addressing issues where there is no individual able/willing to bring a claim or 
to blame and dealing with rights beyond those which are explicitly incorporated into 
domestic law.  For sector-specific enforcers, it was seen that they are able to fulfil many 
of these tasks (they can deal with issues beyond individual cases and are not reliant on 
individuals, can provide remedies and can address unincorporated rights into their work).  
However, sector-specific enforcers are unable to ensure a uniform approach to equality 
and human rights enforcement across society as they can only address concerns within 
their specific sector, they traditionally lack knowledge and expertise of equality and 
human rights and are fairly distant from court jurisprudence.   
 
By focusing on the tasks that courts and sector-specific enforcers are unable/ill-suited to 
fulfil it was possible to outline a role for the Commission in equality and human rights 
enforcement.  This role includes three primary tasks: (1) carrying out enforcement action 
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that courts and sector-specific enforcers are unable to perform (ie wide-ranging society-
wide/multi-sector enforcement); (2) overcoming some of the limitations of courts (eg 
providing advice/legal assistance to enable individuals to access the courts or 
instituting/intervening in proceedings to provide the court with a wider evidence base); 
and (3) coordinating and supporting sector-specific enforcers in their enforcement work 
(ie share knowledge to build up their human rights capabilities and ensure consistent 
enforcement practices between enforcers).   
 
This role does not require a radical reconfiguration of the EHRC in which it totally 
redefines the activities it undertakes but rather requires the Commission to focus on some 
activities more heavily than others and to more greatly pursue certain forms of working.  
Specifically, the Commission needs to place a heavy focus on tasks it is uniquely placed 
to undertake (such as monitoring and inquiries) given that there are no other bodies who 
can complete this work, and particularly to engage in multi-agency work where possible 
to minimise the use of scarce resources.  In relation to the Commission’s legal powers, 
the Commission needs to move away from intervening in cases (due to their inability to 
be objective) to providing legal assistance directly or instituting proceedings themselves.  
Finally, the Commission needs to continue to develop conditions that facilitate mutual 
learning with sector-specific enforcers and consider ways to expand existing work in this 
area.  Alongside greater focus by the Commission, the role outlined also suggests 
additional financial resources from the government are justified to fund activities that no 
other bodies can adequately fulfil, such as inquiries, as otherwise there is a danger that 
significant equality and human rights issues are overlooked.  Finally, the role supports the 
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expansion of the Commission’s legal powers to include assisting human rights cases (as 
it can currently only assist equality cases) otherwise the EHRC is reliant on instituting 
human rights proceedings itself, which can be disempowering for victims.   
 
In addition to outlining a role for the EHRC in equality and human rights enforcement, the 
article has also had the wider aim of illustrating, and hopefully encouraging further 
research on, equality and human rights enforcement beyond the courts.  This is 
particularly important given the extremely small number of equality and human rights 
infringements that make it to the courts (for example, in the education context there are 
only twenty-two reported cases concerning discrimination in state schools since 1983).114  
The continued heavy focus on compliance in courts obscures the important role of other 
bodies in ensuring compliance and implementation (such as the EHRC and sector-
specific enforcers) and thus gives a very narrow glimpse of the reality of equality and 
human rights enforcement.  Given the crucial role these other bodies play in the shared 
regulatory space, the future realisation of equality and human rights requires us to widen 
our perspective.  
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